Category: Ahmed Tabaqchali

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Tabaqchali, Market Review: Oil and the Iraqi Economy

By Ahmed Tabaqchali, Chief Strategist of AFC Iraq Fund.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Market Review: “Oil and the Economy”

The market, as measured by the Rabee Securities RSISX USD Index, increased by 4.5%, and 8.8% for the year. Average daily turnover on the Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) declined for the second month in a row and is currently at the lower end of the levels that prevailed over the last twelve months.

On a positive note, the Rabee Securities RSISX USD Index has reclaimed the upper-end of the uptrend that it established over the last two years (chart below) – a promising development that is in contrast to that of many markets worldwide.

(Source: Iraq Stock Exchange, Rabee Securities, AFC Research, data as February 28th)

Among the index’s constituents, lower-priced Gulf Commercial Bank (BGUC) was up 20.0% for the month, far ahead of the other nine constituents. The next best performing constituent was Bank of Baghdad (BBOB) up 4.7%, followed by Baghdad Soft Drinks (IBSD) up 4.4%, Asiacell (TASC) up 3.3%, the National Bank of Iraq (BNOI) up 2.6%, and Al-Mansour Bank (BMNS) up 2.0%, while the Commercial Bank of Iraq (BCOI) was flat. Decliners were led by Al-Mansour Pharmaceutical Industries (IMAP) which was down 6.5%, followed by National Chemical and Plastics Industries (INCP) down 2.0%, and Kharkh Tour Amusement City (SKTA) which was down 0.3%.

Excluding BGUC, these modest stock price performances for the month haven’t yet reflected the increased bounty brought by high oil prices taking Iraq’s oil sales to an all-time high for a fifth consecutive month (chart below). The country’s high leverage to oil prices and hence to oil sales will have significant positives for both the economy, and the equity market down the line – as a result of the centrality of the government’s oil fuelled spending to the economy.

(Source: Ministry of Oil, AFC Research, data as of February 28th)

There is a great deal of fear built into oil’s current prices, and as such they are unlikely to be sustainable for too long, yet the changed geopolitical landscape as a consequence of the invasion of Ukraine will have significant consequences for the supply and demand of oil. On the demand side, the limited disruptions brought by the Omicron variant on economic activity worldwide since its emergence has solidified market expectations that oil demand in 2022 will return to pre-COVID-19 levels seen in 2019 – there is no reason, at least for now, to expect meaningful change to these expectations following the Ukraine invasion.

However, the same market expectations that supply will itself, like demand, return to its pre-COVID-19 levels will likely be re-examined in light of the pressures that the OPEC+ group will be under in the new changed world order. Prior to the events leading to the current crisis, OPEC+’s plan was to fully unwind by September 2022 the production cuts agreed to in April 2020. However, over the last few months, the plan was facing difficulties as some members of OPEC+ were struggling to return to pre-COVID-19 production levels.

A situation will likely worsen given the wide scope of sanctions levied upon Russia, which will negatively affect its oil production and the production of many of the “+” members of OPEC+ that are closely aligned to Russia. Consequently, supply will likely be meaningfully tighter than anticipated earlier despite many countries releasing oil held within their strategic reserves, the return of full U.S. shale oil production, and possible production increases by Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the changed geopolitical landscape means the return of high-risk premiums to oil prices for a considerable period into the future.

(Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, data as of February 8th)

Oil price expectations – a consequence of the changed dynamics of oil’s supply and demand – and what they mean for the Iraqi economy, are meaningfully higher than those articulated here in the “Outlook for 2022” which argued at the time that “oil prices at these levels are positive for the country’s financial position in that they will provide governments, current and upcoming, with the wherewithal to continue with current expansionary economic policies that will also still allow for the accumulation of budget surpluses. Moreover, they will also lead to multi-year positive balances in the country’s current account which in turn will translate into meaningful increases in Iraq’s foreign exchange reserves.”

Iraq’s equity market outlook and attractive risk-reward profile, in the unfolding new world order, is in sharp contrast to that of many markets worldwide. Firstly, the Iraqi equity market is in the process of emerging from a multi-year bear market that saw the Rabee Securities RSISX USD Index at the end of 2020 down by 68% from its 2014 all-time high – unlike many markets worldwide that have had multi-year bull markets.

Secondly, its 8.8% performance year-to-date is in contrast to the sell-offs experienced by other markets in response to the changed world order dynamics.

Finally, the index’s 8.8% increase year-to-date coming on the back of a +21.4% return in 2021, is by the end of the month still 58% below the 2014 high – underscoring the potential catch-up upside for the equity market and its attractive risk-reward profile versus other global markets (chart below).

Normalised returns for the RSISUSD Index vs MSCI World Index, MSCI Emerging Markets Index and MSCI Frontier Markets Index

(Source: Bloomberg, data as of February 28th)

Please click here to download Ahmed Tabaqchali’s full report in pdf format.

Mr Tabaqchali (@AMTabaqchali) is the Chief Strategist of the AFC Iraq Fund, and is an experienced capital markets professional with over 25 years’ experience in US and MENA markets. He is a Visiting Fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS), and a Senior Non-resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is also a board member of Capital Investments, the investment banking arm of Capital Bank in Jordan.

His comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment.

The post Tabaqchali, Market Review: Oil and the Iraqi Economy first appeared on Iraq Business News.

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Video: Where has Iraq’s Oil Wealth gone?

From Al Jazeera. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Decades of plundering: Where has Iraq’s oil wealth gone?

Ranked as the fourth-biggest oil producer in the world, many would assume that Iraq has the financial resources to weather the pandemic.

But that is not the case – its fragile economy is struggling to cope and it may turn to the International Monetary Fund for assistance.

It has already devalued its currency by almost a fifth, enabling it to eke out more dinars for dollars. Ahmed Tabaqchali, the chief investment officer of AFC Iraq Fund, helps explain where all of Iraq’s money goes:

The post Video: Where has Iraq’s Oil Wealth gone? first appeared on Iraq Business News.

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Zoom Invitation: Iraq 2020, a Country at the Crossroads

You are invited
to hear a discussion of the IBBC Advisory Council’s paper on
‘Iraq 2020, a country at the crossroads’

When: Monday 15th June at 2pm UK
Where: Zoom Platform

The paper published for the new Iraqi Government recommends a number of decisive changes to be implemented without delay, in order for Iraq to be able to navigate the rapidly deepening economic crisis she is facing.

This open public forum takes place in partnership with IRIS (Institute of Regional and International Studies) at AUIS (American University of Iraq, Sulaimani) and Chatham House.

Speakers include:

  • Professor Frank Gunter, Lehigh University
  • Dr Renad Mansour, Chatham House
  • Mr Ahmed Tabaqchali, IRIS at AUIS
  • Professor Mohammed Al-Uzri, University of Leicester
  • Mr Abdul Aziz Shwan Ahmed, Iraqi Government
  • Mr Hani Akkawi, CCC

Click below to read the full paper:

Iraq 2020: a country at the crossroads – English

Iraq 2020: a country at the crossroads – Arabic

CLICK HERE TO REGISTER

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Iraq’s Economy: Spotlight on Oil and Gas

On April 20, 2020, IRIS held a webinar entitled Iraq’s Economy: Spotlight on Oil and Gas.

The discussion focused on Iraq’s economy amidst falling oil prices and additional pressures from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Speakers included IRIS Senior Fellow and AFC Iraq Fund Chief Investment Officer Ahmed Tabaqchali, Iraq Correspondent for Associated Press (AP) Samya Kullab, and MENA Programme Manager at the International Energy Agency (IEA) Ali Al-Saffar.

The discussion was moderated by IRIS Director Mac Skelton:

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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Budget Realties, Protestor Demands

By Ahmed Tabaqchali, CIO of Asia Frontier Capital (AFC) Iraq Fund. This article was originally published by the LSE Middle East Centre.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Iraq’s Political Class’ Dilemma between Budget Realties and Protestor Demands

The twin shocks of the effect of coronavirus on the world economy and the current oil price war will stress Iraq’s budget to the limit, and lead to an economic crisis if it continues for an extended period.

While as extraordinary shocks they were unforeseeable, the Iraqi budget’s structural imbalance would have inevitably led to such an economic crisis – the only question being when and not if.

A low oil price environment exposes the structural faultiness of the budget with projected revenues not covering current spending, which is mostly composed of salaries, pensions and welfare spending. These have increased from 50% of current expenditures in 2004 to an estimated 81% in 2019, and likely to more than 85% in 2020.[1] As such the default choice for the government would be to cancel all investment spending, especially non-oil investment spending, and resort to borrowing.

Such measures have allowed the government to continue functioning, but these come at a huge cost to the economy as Table 2 below shows. Global debt markets are not as accommodating as they were in 2014-17 given Iraq’s estranged relationship with the US and the change in the IMF’s stance toward Iraq. As such the government would have to resort to domestic sources, which ultimately means indirect monetary operations by the CBI at the expense of the its foreign reserves as happened in 2014-16.

Moreover, these measures would only postpone and not resolve the crises, needing much higher oil prices to contain or mask it like in 2017-19. Medium-term oil prices would probably (for Brent prices) settle within a range of $50-60/bbl, which should partially relieve the stress on the budget, but not the need to address its imbalance.

Iraq’s 2019 budget, initially proposed by the prior government, submitted with minor changes by the current government and approved by the current parliament, perpetuated the same deficiencies and weaknessess of all Iraq’s budgets since 2003. Crucially, it deepened the structural imbalance between the budget’s current and investment expenditures, in which public sector wages consumed an ever-increasing share of government revenues.

Moreover, it undermined and reversed most of the small, but essential, fiscal reforms agreed with the IMF in the 2016 Stand-By Agreement (SBA) to address this structural imbalance; and which needed considerable follow-up reforms over the years to put the country on a sustainable path to growth  and reduce the economy’s vulnerabilities to the volatile oil market. The extent of these vulnerabilities came to the fore during the collapse in oil prices in 2014, and coupled with the cost of the ISIS conflict, this led to a sharp contraction to the non-oil economy in 2014-17.

Table 1: Real non-oil GDP change 2014-17. Source: Iraq-Business News

Undeterred by these memories, the budget’s planners, buoyed by the bounty of higher oil revenues, from late 2017 embarked on an expansionary budget that magnified these very vulnerabilities. This was achieved by simultaneously reversing the growth of non-oil revenues and by increasing current spending. Non-oil revenues decreased in both absolute terms and as a percentage of total revenues: -18% and -29% respectively in 2019 and 2018.

Additionally, 25% of these non-oil revenues were in fact oil-related in the form of taxes on foreign oil companies and the budget’s share from profits from the state’s oil companies. Current spending increased by 15% with the salary and pensions component growing by 7.5% instead of decreasing continuously.

The budget’s trumpeted increase of 29% in investment spending hides the fact that only 43% of this total spending for 2019 was earmarked for non-oil investment, which would nevertheless increase by 43% in 2019. However, historically this spending is on paper only, with an execution rate of under 65%. The performance in 2019 was much worse than normal with non-oil investment spending at about IQD 3.3 trn as of November 2019 from a planned budget of IQD 14.0 trn, or about a 24% execution rate.

The budget planners’ aims for 2020 were for a continuation of the expansionary budget of 2019, which dismayed the IMF enough for it to issue a critical country report (19/248) – the first since 2004. Adding to the dismay was the fact that the government’s plan for fiscal probity was based on expectations of continued high oil prices, as well as sticking to its historic under-execution of the budget. Essential budget reforms to address the structural imbalance were delegated to an expression of interest for inclusion in medium term fiscal strategy planning.

The IMF then modelled for a 2020 budget with revenues estimated at IQD 113.1 trn based on oil price assumptions of $55.8/bbl. Expenditures were estimated at IQD 123.2 trn, made up of current expenditures at IQD 99.1 trn, while oil investment spending was estimated at IQD 15.5 trn and non-oil investment spending at IQD 8.6 trn. This would have needed debt financing of IQD 10.0 trn to balance the budget. Since it’s almost impossible to cut the bulk of current spending, the government must have been anticipating a better budgetary situation through Iraqi oil prices higher than $55.8/bbl and from under-executing much needed non-oil investment spending and reconstruction.

By October, plans for budget expenditure ballooned by 31% to IQD 162.0 trn, necessitating debt financing of IQD 48.9 trn. While there are no details apart from spending and deficit figures, the political paralysis following the failure of the prime minister-designate to form a government in early March has put a halt to these runaway expenditure plans.

As long as the political class’ existential fear from the five-month long youth-led countrywide demonstrations continues to ebb and flow, this political paralysis is likely to continue. However, the main economic consequences would be the same whether a new government forms under a new prime minister-designate, or if the current caretaker government continues to limp on. The outcome either way will be that no new budget will be passed, with the government continuing to implement the executed parts of 2019’s budget throughout 2020 according to the ‘1/12th rule’.

Essentially, this means the government will continue to spend (per month) 1/12th of the actual spend in 2019 – effectively extending the current spending component for 2019 in addition to the increased spending of IQD 10.5 trn as a result of government measures to appease the demonstrators in October 2019. The government will likewise continue with the investment projects initiated in 2019.

Estimating the effects of the current events on the Iraqi budget is fraught with uncertainty. Current predictions on the extent of the decline in oil prices mirror those made following the 2014 oil price war, which then assumed a continuation of the decline into the future. This in time proved to be overly pessimistic, as will the current ‘worst-case’ prognoses. Moreover, though the effects of the new coronavirus on the world economy will be profound in Q1/2020, the extent and the continuation of these effects for the rest of the year remains uncertain.

However, these negative effects would be compounded for oil prices by a sharply increased supply in an environment of weakened demand. The upshot would be an extended period of lower oil prices. The table below looks at the budget for 2015-19 and estimates for 2020 based on different realised oil prices for 2020 as whole (please see footnote 2 for notes and assumptions used).

Table 2: Iraq’s budget 2015-20. Source: Iraq Ministry of Finance[2]

Past policies of spending oil revenues on expanding the public payroll and welfare spending, in the process depleting the country’s wealth without building its infrastructure, has resulted in an economy dependent on imports of goods and services, a stunted private sector and a labour market skewed towards public employment. This development has been at the root cause of successive countrywide demonstrations. The need to urgently restructure the budget’s structural imbalances will require painful reforms and a long adjustment period, and thus would need a buy-in by the population at large.

This, given the extent of the current anti-political elite protest movement and the scale of the repression of this movement, is unlikely without significant political reform.

[1] The percentage figures are made up of salaries, pensions and transfers. Transfers are mostly composed of welfare spending and transfers to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which in turn are primarily for salary payments and support to SOEs. Source: IMF Iraq country reports 2004-19.

[2] Revenues and expenditures for 2015-19 sourced from Ministry of Finance (MoF). These figures constitute revenues and expenditures actually received/made at the time and not booked. As such they differ, sometimes significantly, from those provided by the IMF. The crucial difference being that they resemble an actual cash flow statement and not an income statement. This can be seen from the difference between the Ministry of Oil’s (MoO) revenue data which show sales made and the MoF’s data which how funds received which can lag actual sales.
Iraqi oil sales and average Iraqi oil price are taken from MoO website, while average Brent prices can be found here. CBI foreign reserves are as of end of 2019 and are found here. 2019 budget numbers are as of November 2019 and projected to continue into end of 2019. Oil revenues are based on MoO data which are available as of the end of December 2019. The 2020 budget numbers assume a continuation of the budget spent for 2019. It is assumed that Iraq would maintain market share through aggressive pricing and thus that the discount to Brent would increase from $3.35 for 2019 to $4.50.

Disclaimer: Ahmed Tabaqchali’s comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment.

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Conference: Find Out What’s Happening in Iraqi Business

From Peace to prosperity:

The Conference to find out what’s happening for Iraq business.

The Iraq Britain Business Council (IBBC) Autumn Conference in Dubai on December 8th is set against a backdrop of relative peace and security in Iraq, and the prospect of oil revenues surging through the economy is driving a wider range of business opportunities and a prospective 8% increase in GDP.

Peace is enabling the economy to diversify through the revenues that pay for a range of infrastructure projects. So this Autumn we are focusing on a range of sectors set to benefit from a stable Iraq: namely, Water, Transport and Logistics, Energy and Tech.

The recent protests have also spurred on Government reforms and incentives to drive employment, entrepreneurship and service diversity, and increase the volume of opportunity that lies ahead and the prospects for not just business-to-business but also a burgeoning consumer market.

The Iraqi Electricity Minister will likely be speaking about his reforms to open up the market to SME’s, training and new players. Other ministers including those from Construction and Transport are attending.

The recent announcement of a 10year tax-free period for SMEs in Iraq will also stimulate the Tech entrepreneur market and drive the uptake of engineering skills.

At this conference, we will discuss big-picture economics with Professor Frank Gunter (Lehigh University), Ahmed Tabaqchali (AFC Iraq Fund), and Simon Penny (UK Trade & Investment), who will address the economic backdrop in the Middle East, and the context for Iraq in particular.

The World Bank and Wood Plc will cover the water sector, while Rolls Royce, Basra Gateway Terminal (BGT), and Menzies will look at transport and logistics, and Iraq’s Electricity Minister, GE, Siemens and Enka will focus on energy.

Alongside the conference our Tech Forum brings experts on HealthTech and Educational Tech, including speakers from GE, Siemens Healthcare, KPMG, EY, Google and the British Council, among others.

While key opportunities will be outlined, the real opportunity for business is to meet the people directly involved in contracts and supply-chain opportunities. This is the place to do business, to network and to find out what’s happening in the Middle East’s most potentially dynamic market that is Iraq.

For further information and to find the latest updates on speakers – more are expected – please contact  london@webuildiraq.org or visit the website to register for tickets.

https://iraqbritainbusiness.org/event/autumn-conference-at-the-address-hotel-dubai

The year it’s all on the up…

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Conference: Find Out What’s Happening in Iraqi Business

From Peace to prosperity:

The Conference to find out what’s happening for Iraq business.

The Iraq Britain Business Council (IBBC) Autumn Conference in Dubai on December 8th is set against a backdrop of relative peace and security in Iraq, and the prospect of oil revenues surging through the economy is driving a wider range of business opportunities and a prospective 8% increase in GDP.

Peace is enabling the economy to diversify through the revenues that pay for a range of infrastructure projects. So this Autumn we are focusing on a range of sectors set to benefit from a stable Iraq: namely, Water, Transport and Logistics, Energy and Tech.

The recent protests have also spurred on Government reforms and incentives to drive employment, entrepreneurship and service diversity, and increase the volume of opportunity that lies ahead and the prospects for not just business-to-business but also a burgeoning consumer market.

The Iraqi Electricity Minister will likely be speaking about his reforms to open up the market to SME’s, training and new players. Other ministers including those from Construction and Transport are attending.

The recent announcement of a 10year tax-free period for SMEs in Iraq will also stimulate the Tech entrepreneur market and drive the uptake of engineering skills.

At this conference, we will discuss big-picture economics with Professor Frank Gunter (Lehigh University), Ahmed Tabaqchali (AFC Iraq Fund), and Simon Penny (UK Trade & Investment), who will address the economic backdrop in the Middle East, and the context for Iraq in particular.

The World Bank and Wood Plc will cover the water sector, while Rolls Royce, Basra Gateway Terminal (BGT), and Menzies will look at transport and logistics, and Iraq’s Electricity Minister, GE, Siemens and Enka will focus on energy.

Alongside the conference our Tech Forum brings experts on HealthTech and Educational Tech, including speakers from GE, Siemens Healthcare, KPMG, EY, Google and the British Council, among others.

While key opportunities will be outlined, the real opportunity for business is to meet the people directly involved in contracts and supply-chain opportunities. This is the place to do business, to network and to find out what’s happening in the Middle East’s most potentially dynamic market that is Iraq.

For further information and to find the latest updates on speakers – more are expected – please contact  london@webuildiraq.org or visit the website to register for tickets.

https://iraqbritainbusiness.org/event/autumn-conference-at-the-address-hotel-dubai

The year it’s all on the up…

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The debate over Iraqi Kurdistan’s share of Budget

The Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies has just published a new report from our Expert Blogger Ahmed Tabaqchali:

The current debate over the interpretation of the 2019 budget that governs the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) share of the federal budget in return for contributing 250,000 bbl/d to federal oil exports has echoes of the first conflict in April 2012 on the issue.

The adept quote above by the International Crisis Group (ICC), in its description of the relationship between the two sides leading to that conflict, is as applicable today as it was then, and over the many repeats of similar conflicts in the intervening years.

The current flare up is initiated by members of the federal parliament against the Government of Iraq (GoI) over its continuing payments to the KRG, under the terms of the 2019 budget, while the KRG has not or refused to honour its obligations under the terms of the same budget.

The internal and external dynamics of the players on both sides, the federal politicians and the regional Kurdish politicians, follow the same trajectory that led to countless struggles over this issue and others since 2003. Each side is not only blind and deaf to the other side’s needs and motives but views it with suspicion and mistrust.

Unless something breaks the mould, either an intervention by Iraq’s international stakeholders or a change in the balance of relative power between the two, both will continue to think and act in the same manner that each had acted in the past, while still expecting a different outcome for the conflict or a different response form the other side.

Read Ahmed Tabaqchali’s full report here.

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Rosneft in the Kurdish Region: Moscow’s Balancing Act

By Ahmed Tabaqchali. Originally published by Iraq in Context; re-published by Iraq Business News with permission. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Between February 2017 and mid-October, Rosneft signed a number of deals with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) that established for it, and by extension for Russia, a major position as both an investor and stakeholder in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI)’s hydrocarbon resources and infrastructure.

The move was interpreted, especially by the KRG, as implicit support for the KRG in its bid for independence, especially in light of the latest deal signed following the reassertion of Iraq’s federal control over Kirkuk and other disputed territories. While there is an element of truth to this thinking, the deals are part of a wider geopolitical positioning for Russia as a major gas supplier to Europe and as an emerging power in the Middle East.

The deals provide Rosneft, and by extension Russia, effective control of the KRG’s Oil & Gas infrastructure, and a controlling stake in the region’s finances in more ways than one.

Within the oil space it has established this in three ways. The first was by providing USD 1.5bn in financing via forward oil sales payable over 3-5 years. This would be payable in kind from the KRG’s exports, until recently at about 550,000-600,000 barrels per day (bbl/d). However, the loss of the Kirkuk fields takes away about 430,000 bbl/d of production or eventually about half of the KRG’s exports.

This leaves the KRG with a tiny revenue stream after payments to International Oil Companies (IOC)’s, from which to make payments on forward oil sales of up USD 3.5 bn including Rosneft’s USD 1.5bn. A complicating factor is the repayment of other KRG debt, estimated at over USD 21bn by end of 2017, which will have to be factored into debt payment sustainability.

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Interview with Ahmed Tabaqchali, CIO of AFC Iraq Fund

Ahead of the Basra Oil, Gas & Infrastructure Conference taking place on the 30-31 October in Beirut, we caught up with one of the speakers, Ahmed Tabaqchali the CIO of AFC Iraq Fund on the importance of Iraq, the economy and what to look forward to at the event.

Q. Why Iraq is such an important market in the Middle East?

A. The size and quality of Iraq’s hydrocarbon wealth would alone make the country one of the most significant markets in the region. As a consequence of over 35 years of conflict, much of Iraq has not seen any meaningful exploration and thus the potential for significant discoveries is exciting. The rebuilding of its hydrocarbon industry since 2003 has a long way to go, and as such there are enormous opportunities for upgrading the sector across the whole spectrum.

Q. What are the positive implications for the economy and for Basra for the new era of reconstructing Iraq?

A. The reconstruction process will have far reaching implications for the overall economy and Basra in particular with the potential that the associated economic activities to contribute to the development of a diversified economy. The short term effect impact on the economy would be to add fuel to the expansionary economic effects produced by the reversal of the negative forces, i.e. escalating costs of war & collapsing oil prices, that crushed the economy over the last 3 years.

Q. While the Iraqi economy is driven by the state, how do you assess Basra province role as Iraq’s economic capital in driving multiple industries?

A. Arguably, the state’s domination of the economy has stifled the development of both the private sector and regional development in the country. Basra can and should play a leading role in reigniting economic growth given its position as the economic powerhouse of the country. Its rich history & traditions coupled with its mineral & human wealth are significant assets that would allow it to assume this leading role.

Q. How do you at Asia Frontier Capital assess Basra’s role?

A. Personally, Basra has a special place in my heart as it is the burial site of my grandmother since the 1940’s when my grandfather was the governor of Basra, and so I have a bias for the province and its people. It’s worth repeating that its  rich history & traditions coupled with its mineral & human wealth give it an outsized role in Iraq’s future.

Q. What is the role of AFC in Iraq in enhancing projects performance and driving growth?

A. The AFC Iraq Fund, as an investor in Iraq’s equity market signifies AFC’s belief in the long-term economic potential of the country. As long-term institutional investors, we bring foreign capital into the country and contribute to the development of the country’s institutional investor sector, which like much of its frontier market peers is underdeveloped. The long-term horizon of Institutional investors allows them to invest counter cyclically especially during financial crisis by acting as shock absorbers which in the process provides the underlying companies with shareholder stability that allows them to rebuild, grow and expand.

Q. What is your main interest at the Conference? And what are you going to discuss at the Basra Oil, Gas & Infrastructure 2017 Conference in Beirut 30-31st of October?

A. The conference provides an opportunity to meet the players and participants in potentially one of the most dynamic drivers of Iraq’s economy through Basra’s industries spanning oil, gas, power, petrochemicals, infrastructure, construction, transport and logistics. I am hoping to discuss the role and challenges of the private sector in the reconstruction process. Specifically, to explore the role that institutional investors can play as shareholders in infrastructure projects both as an additional source of financing and as contributors to long-term stability as anchor investors.

(Source: CWC)